












ARBITRATION AND ASSIMILATION 
STEPHEN J. WARE* 
Arbitration, I argued in a recent article, allows parties to privatize law.1 
This has important benefits. Consider, for example, a hypothetical trade 
association—the Widget Dealers Association. The Widget Dealers 
Association could require, as a condition of membership in the Association, 
that all members agree to arbitrate all their disputes with each other. The 
arbitrators would be widget dealers, themselves. These arbitrators, unlike 
judges or jurors, would know and respect the norms and customs of the 
widget industry. The arbitrators would be inclined to decide cases in accord 
with these norms and customs and could even be contractually required to do 
so.2 Alternatively the Widget Dealers Association might choose to codify 
some of its norms and customs by creating written rules that would amount 
to privately-created statutes.3 The arbitrators could then be contractually 
required to decide cases in accord with these written rules. 
 Not only can agreements require arbitrators to apply rules, 
agreements can require arbitrators to write reasoned opinions. As the 
Widget Dealers Association arbitrators build a supply of precedents, 
they can be contractually required to follow precedents in future cases. 
So the privately-created law consists of not only unwritten norms 
and/or written rules, but also decisional law. In short, arbitration can 
produce a sophisticated, comprehensive legal system. 
 Even better, it can produce many such systems. The law—
unwritten norms, written rules and decisional law—of the Widget 
Dealers Association may differ from the law of the Gadget Dealers 
Association. Both may differ from the laws of the Sierra Club, the 
Alabama Baptist Convention, the American Association of Retired 
People, the Rotary Club, or the Saab Owners Association. Thus 
emerges privatized law in the fullest sense. There is diversity because 
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what is best for some is not best for others. But there is also a process 
of experimentation in which lawmakers learn from each other and 
copy laws which seem better. There may even be open competition 
among different lawmakers to earn money by producing better laws. 
A market for law develops. This privatized system produces better law 
than does a system in which government monopolizes lawmaking. 
The principles animating privatization around the world apply to 
lawmaking just as they apply to coal mining or mail delivery.4 
This passage, quoted from my recent article, is merely a quick sketch of 
privatizing law through arbitration. Much detail remains to be added, 
especially detail regarding the benefits of pursuing this vision. Some of that 
detail is provided by Professor Gary Spitko in a recent article that vividly 
portrays the benefits of privatizing law through arbitration in a particular 
context. Spitko discusses arbitration in the context of testamentary decisions 
by gay people and other “abhorrent” (his word) testators.5 Spitko emphasizes 
that the decisions of such testators generally receive less respect from judges 
and juries than do the decisions of other testators.6 This lack of respect, 
Spitko says, “arises from one part ignorance, one part fear and one part 
loathing.”7 Spitko recommends that “abhorrent” testators seek to ensure that 
disputes arising out of their testamentary decisions be resolved by arbitration, 
in which one or more of the arbitrators is either a member of the testator’s 
“minority culture” or at least sympathetic to it.8 
 4. See id. at 746-47. 
 5. E. Gary Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent Testator From 
Majoritarian Cultural Norms Through Minority-Culture Arbitration, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 275 
(1999). 
 6. See id. at 283-85, 286-90. 
 7. Id. at 288. 
 8. Id. at 294-97, 307-14. While I generally applaud Professor Spitko’s article, I am not 
persuaded by all of it. For instance, Spitko recognizes that current arbitration law enforces arbitration 
clauses only when the requirements to form a contract have been met, and he anticipates the argument 
that heirs who have not manifested assent to an arbitration clause are not bound to arbitrate merely 
because of a clause in the will. See id. at 297. Spitko replies that the heirs’ rights are derivative of the 
decedent’s right to pass her property to the persons of her choosing. See id. at 299-303. But this is not 
entirely true. For example, testators effectively lack the freedom to leave their spouses anything less 
than the legally required “forced share.” See LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY 
LAW 526 (2d ed. 1997). Nevertheless, the “manifestation of assent” objection to Spitko’s proposal 
might be largely solved by the testator, when drafting her will, asking her likely heirs to sign 
arbitration agreements. For unborn or unascertained heirs this might require the appointment of a 
guardian ad litem. 
 Another objection to Spitko’s proposal is that statutes confer upon courts exclusive jurisdiction to 
probate an estate. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2101.24 (West 1993) (granting probate court 
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine actions to contest the validity of wills). Courts may hold 
that such statutes trump any common law right of private parties, testators, to oust the court’s 
jurisdiction to probate an estate and confer it upon another private party, the arbitrator. In other words, 













While largely accepting the points that Professor Spitko and I make, 
Professor Ron Krotoszynski suggests that we present an incomplete picture.9 
He acknowledges the benefits we attribute to privatizing law through 
arbitration, but contends that we undervalue the costs of doing so. In 
particular, he expresses “grave doubts about the wisdom of balkanizing the 
adjudication of basic legal rights in private courts defined by a common 
membership in a particular cultural group.”10 Krotoszynski favors 
assimilation over separation,11 and worries that privatizing law through 
arbitration will impede assimilation. Relatedly, he worries that privatizing 
law through arbitration “would tend to exacerbate, rather than reduce, the 
legitimacy problems that the federal and state courts currently face.”12 As 
more of a group’s disputes go to arbitration, courts become less skilled at 
handling that group’s disputes and less sensitive to that group, which in turn 
further lowers the court system’s reputation with that group. 
I will reply to these concerns in this brief article. Before doing so, 
however, I note that Professor Krotoszynski’s discussion of arbitration is 
merely a small part of a broader project, an article entitled The New Legal 
Process: Games People Play and the Quest for Legitimate Judicial Decision 
Making.13 That article counsels legal scholars to quit debating what 
constitutes substantive justice and to start focusing on procedural justice. 
Because devotees of Critical Legal Studies and Law & Economics, for 
instance, will never agree on the conclusions judges should reach, Crits and 
economists should put aside those substantive differences and join together to 
pursue “a project dedicated to defining how judges should go about their 
task.”14 In other words, Krotoszynski’s article calls for nothing less than a 
reversal of the direction legal scholarship has taken for at least a generation. 
Krotoszynski’s article is ambitious. It is also erudite and witty. It deserves to 
be read in its entirety and deserves thoughtful consideration by those who can 
address its vast reach. At this time, however, I am prepared to address only 
its concerns about privatizing law through arbitration. Krotoszynski 
statutory authorization may be required to effectuate Spitko’s proposal. Current arbitration statutes 
make enforceable only arbitration clauses in a “contract,” not in a will. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994); 
UNIF. ARB. ACT § 1 (1955). 
 9. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The New Legal Process: Games People Play and the Quest 
for Legitimate Judicial Decision Making, 77 WASH U. L.Q. 993, 1041-42 (2000). 
 10. Id. at 1036. 
 11. See id. at n.169 (citing Martin Luther King’s “I Have a Dream” speech and stating that 
Spitko’s “call for cultural separatism” is consistent with the “less optimistic” Malcom X and Marcus 
Garvey who “largely reject integration and assimilation”). 
 12. Id. at 1036. 
 13. See id. at 993. 
 14. Id. at 994. 













expresses those concerns in an insightful and even-handed manner. He has 
the rare ability to take arguments with which he disagrees and present them 
in their best light. That said, disagreements remain. 
I. CONCERN ABOUT ARBITRATION FURTHER DELEGITIMIZING COURTS 
My recently published article on privatizing law through arbitration 
argued that parties using arbitration benefit from this privatization.15 And 
Krotoszynski concedes, at least for the sake of argument, that “from the 
perspective of an individual litigant, significant benefits attach to exiting the 
public courts in favor of a private dispute resolution system”.16 But 
Krotoszynski objects that: 
the overall social costs of such a development are too high to be 
acceptable. Assuming that conflicts involving members of different 
guilds or cultural groups will arise and that adjudication of such claims 
will take place in the public courts, the success of an exit strategy will 
simply further cripple the ability of the public courts to earn the trust 
and confidence of particular cultural subgroups within the community. 
Although the creation of private law systems would enhance the 
satisfaction of those with the luxury of relying on the private law 
system with the fairness of adjudication of claims within the [private] 
system, it would tend to further delegitimize the public courts and 
increase the dissatisfaction of those forced to litigate their claims 
within the public law system.17 
One could respond, as Professor Gary Spitko does, that competition from 
arbitration might cause government courts to improve themselves, thus 
increasing their legitimacy.18 Organizations protected from competition 
become lazy and unresponsive, so subjecting the courts to increased 
competition will motivate them to do better. This may be or may not be true. 
Whether government agencies, including courts, respond to competition in 
the salutary way private businesses generally do is doubtful.19 So I reply 
 15. Ware, supra note 1, at 744-47. Accord Spitko, supra note 5, at 294-97, 307-14. 
 16. Krotoszynski, supra note 9, at 1041. 
 17. Id. This argument resembles a common argument against private-school vouchers: the public 
schools will be even worse if the good students with the motivated parents are able to use private 
schools.  
 18. “[T]hose minority-culture litigants who choose arbitration in an attempt to circumvent law 
that they find dysfunctional for their particular circumstances, inadvertently might also further law 
reform by providing a model for comparison.” E. Gary Spitko, Judge Not: In Defense of Minority-
culture Arbitration, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1065, 1082 (2000). 
 19. Competition’s salutary effect on private business derives in part from the fact that private 













differently to Professor Krotoszynski’s concerns about delegitimizing the 
court system. 
II. TWO TYPES OF ARBITRATION 
Krotoszynski contends that “complete exit from the public courts is 
simply not feasible.”20 He seems to concede that arbitration of all disputes 
among members of the same group is feasible, but says that adjudication of 
“conflicts involving members of different guilds or cultural groups will . . . 
take place in the public courts.”21 This is not necessarily so. Arbitration can 
be used to resolve disputes among members of different groups. Indeed, it 
already is. 
Current arbitration can usefully be divided into two types: intra-group 
arbitration and general arbitration.22 Intra-group arbitration resolves disputes 
among members of a small, cohesive group. The best examples of such 
groups are trade associations.23 Disputes among merchants within the same 
industry have been resolved by arbitration for centuries.24 Countless trade 
associations arbitrate disputes among their members.25 In many trade 
association arbitrations the parties have no lawyers representing them and the 
arbitrator is not a lawyer.26 “The arbitrator may have a similar background to 
the parties, or be engaged in the same business; he is likely, then, to be 
businesses go out of business if they become too lazy and unresponsive. In contrast, a lazy and 
unresponsive government operation can “stay in business” so long as it has political support. 
Krotoszynski himself recognizes that “the public courts might not respond to the challenge with 
sufficient alacrity.” Krotoszynski, supra note 9, at 1042 n.192. 
 20. Id. at 1041. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Soia Mentschikoff’s venerable article on commercial arbitration listed three types of 
arbitration, two of which correspond to intra-group and general arbitration. Mentschikoff’s third type 
is un-administered arbitration, i.e., naming particular individuals to arbitrate and to administer the 
proceedings without assistance from an organization like a trade association or the American 
Arbitration Association. See Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846 
(1961). Unadministered arbitration is, in my terms, intra-group arbitration when the parties share 
membership in a small, cohesive group and is general arbitration when the parties do not share such 
membership. 
 23. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search 
for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996) [hereinafter Merchant Law]; Lisa 
Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 
21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 148 (1992). 
 24. See, e.g., William C. Jones, Three Centuries of Commercial Arbitration in New York: a Brief 
Survey, 1956 WASH. U. L.Q. 193. 
 25. See, e.g., Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 23; Mentschikoff, supra note 22. 
 26. “In maritime arbitration, for example, it is the usual practice to stipulate the arbitrators ‘shall 
be commercial men’—a phrase not meant to exclude women, but definitely meant to exclude 
lawyers.” JOHN S. MURRAY, ALAN SCOTT RAU & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, PROCESSES OF DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION 693 (2d ed. 1996).  













familiar with the presuppositions and understandings of the trade.”27 The 
received wisdom is that trade association arbitration thrives in part because 
merchants want disputes resolved by those who know and respect the 
customs and norms of their trade. Merchants also choose arbitration over 
litigation because they seek quick, inexpensive, and confidential 
adjudication.28 
Trade associations are not the only example of intra-group arbitration. 
Another example is the Beth Din, “a rabbinical tribunal having authority to 
advise and pass upon matters of traditional Jewish law.”29 The majority of 
cases now heard by these private arbitrators seem to concern divorce 
matters.30 
As valuable as intra-group arbitration is for members of the groups 
involved, it is plainly not designed for disputes involving non-members. If 
intra-group arbitration was the only arbitration, then I would share 
Krotoszynski’s belief that many disputes between members of different 
groups will inevitably be litigated, rather than arbitrated.31 But intra-group 
arbitration is not the only form of arbitration. There is also general 
arbitration. 
 27. Id. at 504.  
 28. See id. at 503-04. 
 29. See Avitzur v. Avitzur, 459 N.Y.S. 2d 572, 573 (N.Y. 1983) (enforcing agreement to 
arbitrate before Beth Din); see generally Note, Rabbinical Courts: Modern Day Solomons, 6 COL. J. 
LAW & SOC. PROB. 49 (1970). 
 30. See MURRAY, RAU & SHERMAN, supra note 26, at 513.  
 31. Krotoszynski asserts that “a litigant who is not a member of a particular guild or minority 
group would undoubtedly refuse to consent to the adjudication of a dispute before an adjudicator or 
panel identified completely with a particular guild or minority group.” Krotoszynski, supra note 9, at 
1041, n.191. While this might be true when applied to post-dispute agreements to arbitrate, it is not 
true of pre-dispute agreements. Non-members of an organization do, in fact, agree to arbitrate their 
disputes with organization members before arbitrators affiliated with that organization. See, e.g., 
Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165 (Cal. 1981).  
 In Scissor-Tail, Bill Graham, promoter of legendary rock concerts, contracted with Scissor-Tail, a 
corporation wholly owned by musician Leon Russell, for Russell’s musical services. The contract 
obligated the parties to submit every dispute arising out of it “for determination by the International 
Executive Board of the [American] Federation [of Musicians] . . . and such determination shall be 
conclusive, final and binding upon the parties.” Id. at 168. The American Federation of Musicians is a 
union of which Russell was a member. In short, Graham and Russell agreed that Russell’s union 
would be the arbitrator. See generally Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability After 
Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1001, 1018-19 (1996) (discussing 
Scissor-Tail). 
 Some would argue that another example of this phenomenon occurs when investors agree to 
arbitrate disputes with their securities dealers before arbitrators selected by the National Association of 
Securities Dealers. Id. at 1018. One ground for a court to vacate an arbitration award is the arbitrator’s 
bias, see 9 U.S.C. § 10(a), and the unconscionability doctrine might prevent enforcement of a non-
member’s pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate before arbitrators affiliated with the member’s 
organizations. See Ware, supra, at 1018-22. 













General arbitration resolves disputes between parties who share no 
membership in any small, cohesive group. General arbitration is often 
administered by the American Arbitration Association or one of its newer 
rivals, such as the National Arbitration Forum and JAMS/Endispute. On the 
international level, general arbitration is often administered by organizations 
like the International Chamber of Commerce and the London Court of 
International Arbitration. 
To reiterate, general arbitration involves parties who share no 
membership in any small, cohesive group. Contracts in a huge variety of 
contexts contain clauses requiring the parties to submit disputes to general 
arbitration. Examples of such contracts include: 
- a retail installment contract between an auto dealer and a consumer,32 
- a home termite protection plan,33 
- a construction contract between a university and a contractor,34 
- a homeowners insurance policy,35 and 
- a consumer loan agreement.36 
Because the disputing parties often have little in common, general 
arbitration typically lacks a set of norms and customs shared by both parties. 
In other words, general arbitration lacks an analog to the customs of the 
merchants in a particular industry or the Judaism of the Beth Din. 
Also, general arbitration is usually more “lawyerized” than intra-group 
arbitration. Lawyers typically represent parties in general arbitration and the 
arbitrators in general arbitration are more likely to be lawyers than are the 
arbitrators in intra-group arbitration.37 As a result, general arbitration is more 
legalistic than intra-group arbitration. Extra-legal norms like mercantile 
custom or Judaism, play less of a role, if any. If any extra-legal norms do 
play a role in general arbitration, they are likely to be the extra-legal norms 
 32. See, e.g., Jim Burke Automotive, Inc. v. Murphy, 739 So. 2d 1084 (Ala. 1999). 
 33. See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995). 
 34. See, e.g., Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 
U.S. 468 (1989). 
 35. See, e.g., American Bankers Ins. Co. of Florida v. Crawford, No. 1972246, 1999 WL 553725 
(Ala., July 30, 1999). 
 36. See, e.g., Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes Between Consumers and Financial 
Institutions: A Serious Threat to Consumer Protection, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 267 (1995). 
 37. “Lawyers in fact play a dominant part in many AAA arbitrations. As of 1994, for example, 
there were 12,600 names on the AAA’s construction arbitration panel, and more than 40% of these 
were attorneys—almost twice as many as the next largest professional category, engineers.” MURRAY, 
RAU & SHERMAN, supra note 26, at 693. 













that would influence a judge or a jury, such as the Golden Rule or plain 
common-sense. 
The success of general arbitration is what leads me to doubt Professor 
Krotoszynski’s assertion that “conflicts involving members of different 
guilds or cultural groups will . . . take place in the public courts.”38 The 
success of general arbitration is part of what leads me to differ with 
Krotoszynski about the prospects for privatizing law through arbitration. 
What Krotoszynski calls a “mass exodus”39 from courts to arbitration is both 
more feasible and more desirable than Krotoszynski suggests. 
III. MASS EXODUS FROM COURTS TO ARBITRATION 
To see how feasible a mass exodus from courts to arbitration is, imagine 
that all automobile insurance policies had arbitration clauses making all the 
insurer’s other policyholders third-party beneficiaries of the promises to 
arbitrate.40 
Then an auto accident involving, for instance, two Allstate customers 
would go to arbitration, not litigation. If all the insurers contracted 
with each other, they could extend this arbitration system to accidents 
involving customers of different insurers. The negligence law of auto 
accidents could be taken away from judges and juries and produced, 
instead, by arbitrators. Nor would the arbitration clause in auto 
insurance policies have to be limited to auto disputes. If the clause was 
written broadly enough to cover a land dispute between neighbors or a 
testamentary dispute between devisees, the law in those areas would 
be privately-created, too. Nor would insurers have to be the only hub 
of hub-and-spoke arbitration agreements. A magazine could be a hub 
with spokes connecting all its subscribers. Mastercard could be a hub 
with spokes connecting all its cardholders. Other hubs might be 
created for the sole purpose of dispute resolution. 
. . . 
 If arbitration clauses appeared in the contracts of a few major 
hubs—such as the utilities providing water, electricity or phone 
service—nearly every American might well agree to arbitrate any 
 38. Krotoszynski, supra note 9, at 1041. 
 39. Id. at 1035. 
 40. See Ware, supra note 1, at 752. 













dispute with anyone.41 
In short, a few simple steps are all it would take to effect a mass exodus from 
litigation to arbitration.42 
Demonstrating the feasibility of a mass exodus from litigation to 
arbitration meets Krotoszynski’s test for the desirability of such an exodus. 
Krotoszynski’s concern about privatizing is that, while those in arbitration 
might benefit, those remaining in litigation would be even worse off.43 If I 
am correct that no significant number of disputes need remain in litigation, 
then Krotoszynski’s concern is satisfied. Everyone benefits because everyone 
is arbitrating.44 
 41. Id. Since writing this passage, I have identified a counter-argument which has not, to my 
knowledge, been addressed by courts or commentators. The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) says: 
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving 
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or 
transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to 
submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, 
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for 
the revocation of any contract. 
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). Leaving aside maritime transactions, this provision only requires courts to enforce 
arbitration clauses if the “controversy” “arise[s] out of” the contract containing the clause. Even if the 
arbitration clause in an automobile insurance policy was written broadly enough to cover land disputes 
and testamentary disputes, enforcement of the clause with respect to such disputes would not be 
required by the FAA. Such enforcement would be a matter of state law and such enforcement probably 
would be required in most states. For example, the Uniform Arbitration Act (“UAA”) says: 
A written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration or a provision in a written 
contract to submit to arbitration any controversy thereafter arising between the parties is valid, 
enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation 
of any contract. . . . 
UNIF. ARB. ACT § 1 (1955) (emphasis added). This language lacks the “arising out of” limitation 
found in the FAA. The UAA has been enacted in 35 states and 14 other jurisdictions have substantially 
similar statutes. See REVISED UNIF. ARB. ACT [hereinafter RUAA], Prefatory Note, at 4 (Tentative 
Draft No. 4, February 19, 1999). For the text of the RUAA see National Conference of Commissioners 
of Uniform State Laws, Drafts of Uniform and Model Acts (visited Dec. 23, 1999) 
<http://law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulc_form.htm>. 
 42. Why would Mastercard, for example, put in its cardholder agreements an arbitration clause 
requiring cardholders to arbitrate claims against parties other than Mastercard? Perhaps because those 
other parties pay Mastercard to do so. 
 43. See Krotoszynski, supra note 9, at 1036.  
 44. While the feasibility of a mass exodus from litigation to arbitration meets Krotoszynski’s test 
for the desirability of such an exodus, it does not satisfy others’ concerns about arbitration. That is 
because these others hold one or both of two views. The first view is that litigation is better than 
arbitration for the disputing parties themselves. See, e.g., Geraldine Szott Moohr, Opting In or Opting 
Out: The New Legal Process or Arbitration, 77 WASH U. L.Q. 1087, 1092 (2000) (arbitration “may 
not produce decisions acceptable to cultural minorities” because of its “limitations” such as lack of 
evidentiary rules, discovery, reasoned opinions and right to appeal). These are not “limitations” 
because, as Moohr acknowledges, the parties may contract around them. See generally 3 IAN R. 
MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH, FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 32.4 
(1995). Indeed, the procedural rules of litigation are more limiting because the parties have less room 
to structure their adjudication as they wish in court than they do in arbitration.  













Professor Krotoszynski, with his penchant for sports metaphors, puts it 
this way: “creating a ‘league of their own’ is not objectionable, provided that 
regularized interleague play takes place.”45 What I am suggesting is that the 
interleague play can occur in arbitration, rather than in government courts. 
While intra-group arbitration is a league of their own, general arbitration is 
interleague play. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The case for privatizing law through arbitration survives Krotoszynski’s 
challenge. The case for privatizing law through arbitration is largely the case 
for privatizing generally. Privatizing often appeals to utilitarians as a means 
to increase efficiency.46 From a utilitarian perspective, the interesting 
question is whether adjudication and the production of law are public 
goods.47 Addressing this question requires a comparison of “market failure” 
with “government failure.”48 
More to Krotoszynski’s point, privatizing constrains the size and power of 
 The view that litigation is better for the disputing parties than arbitration must confront the fact 
that arbitration only occurs when the parties have chosen it by contract. If the parties have the capacity 
to contract, i.e., they are sane adults, why not let them choose for themselves whether arbitration or 
litigation is better for them? The counter-argument denies that arbitration is really “chosen” by 
employees, consumers, and others presented with take-it-or-leave-it form contracts. This raises a 
worthy debate that implicates fundamental doctrines of contract law. Compare, e.g., Paul D. 
Carrington & Paul Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 331, 338; Sarah Rudolph 
Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements 
Between Employers and Employees, 64 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 449 (1996); Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or 
Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 637 (1996), with Christopher Drahozal, “Unfair” Arbitration Agreements (forthcoming); Stephen 
J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law (With a Contractualist Reply to 
Carrington & Haagen), 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 195 (1998); Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration 
and Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 83 (1996). 
 The second source of concern about arbitration is the view that even if arbitration is better for the 
disputing parties themselves, litigation serves broader societal interests which should trump the 
preferences of individual parties. See, e.g., Moohr, supra at 1093 (“arbitration is not an appropriate 
forum in which to decide employment discrimination issues, even when the forum serves the interests 
of the parties”). Many commentators have made this argument. See Ware, Employment Arbitration 
and Voluntary Consent, supra, at n.92 (citing commentators). And I agree that claims (such as 
employment discrimination claims) arising under mandatory legal rules should not be arbitrable if we 
are to preserve the mandatory (as opposed to default) character of those rules. See Ware, supra note 1, 
at 727-44. 
 45. Krotoszynski, supra note 9, at 1041. 
 46. See, e.g., Klaus M. Schmidt, The Costs and Benefits of Privatization: An Incomplete 
Contracts Approach, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1 (1996). See also BRUCE L. BENSON, THE ENTERPRISE 
OF LAW: JUSTICE WITHOUT THE STATE 235-52 (1990). 
 47. Compare, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication As a Private Good, 8 
J. LEGAL STUD. 235 (1979), with BENSON, supra note 46, at 272-74 & 277-86. 
 48. See, e.g., BENSON, supra note 46, at 271-311. 













government, thus furthering core liberal goals of freedom and diversity.49 
Krotoszynski’s worry about privatizing law through arbitration is that this 
freedom and diversity will impede assimilation. Professor Krotoszynski fears 
the separation of different groups into their own little, isolated cocoons. And 
intra-group arbitration does permit just that. But people will leave their 
cocoons even if not forced to do so by a government court monopoly on 
adjudication.50 Indeed, much of human history is the story of progress from 
isolated, warring clans toward a global community in which people, ideas, 
and goods move freely around the world. On many occasions, the progress of 
assimilation proceeded faster than the ability of government courts to assert 
jurisdiction over the inevitable disputes, so those in the vanguard of 
assimilation used arbitration.51 In our era, this is exemplified by the “almost 
universal” use of arbitration in international commercial transactions.52 
Arbitration is not necessarily antithetical to the assimilation of different 
groups. While intra-group arbitration allows for various groups to separate 
into their own cocoons, general arbitration can be the handmaiden of 
assimilation. Both types of arbitration deserve to flourish. 
 49. See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 7-36 (1962). 
 50. And if those in a particular group, say the Amish, choose to stay in their cocoon, is that really 
so bad that they should be forced to assimilate? Cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding 
that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prevent a state from compelling Amish parents to cause 
their children, who have graduated from the eighth grade, to attend formal high school to age 16). 
 51. See generally Tom W. Bell, Polycentric Law, 7 HUMANE STUD. REV. 1 (Winter 1991/92); 
BENSON, supra note 46, at 11-83. 
 52. See, e.g., Justice Kerr, International Arbitration v. Litigation, J. BUS. L. 164, 165, 171 
(1980). 
 
